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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
obligated to pay him his commission, as long as the procured customer did
business with the defendant. Clearly then this was not a contract which could be
performed within a year and the Court properly held it to be within the statute.
Inferprefafion Of Escalafor Clause
Bethlehem Steel Company v. Turner Construction Company20 involved the
interpretation of the meaning of words used in the price-adjusting (escalator)
clause of a construction sub-contract. The Court proceeded on the theory that
construction of contract terms is a matter of law where the language is plain and
unambiguous. 21 Plaintiff, Bethlehem Company, agreed to furnish, erect and paint all
structural steel work in a building which general contractor Turner Company was
building for Mutual Company, the owner. While the contract in which the disputed
clause appears was made by plaintiff with Turner Company that company was
acting for Mutual and it is Mutual that is hereinafter referred to as defendant.
The escalator clause provided:
The price or prices herein stated are based on prices for com-
ponent materials, labor rates applicable to the fabrication and erection
thereof and freight rates, in effect as of the date of this proposal. If, at
any time prior to completion of performance of the work to be per-
formed hereunder, any of said material prices, labor rates and/or freight
rates shall be increased or decreased, then in respect of any of said work
performed thereafter there shall be a corresponding increase or decrease
in prices stated.""
The dispute arose over the meaning of "component materials."
Part of the formula for computing changes in the contract price was based
on the labor rates for fabricating and erecting the component materials, but
made no mention of labor rates along the steel production line. Use of the word
"thereof" in the above quoted clause indicated that the clause in its entirety related
to the erection job and not to the manufacture of steel. Taking the language of
the clause as a whole, the Court held, as a matter of law, that the intent of the
parties was that "component materials" should mean steel products like bars
and sheets that are used in the structural steel framework of a building.
Generally, the purpose of a price-adjusting clause is to protect against
unanticipated or unpredictable changes in price which might render the bargain
unduly harsh. However, in the instant case, the $10 per ton increase in the price
of steel products seems to have been already in effect and known to both parties
20. 2 N.Y.2d 456, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957).
21. Accord, Brainard v. New York Central Ry., 242 N.Y. 125, 133, 151
N.E. 152 (1926).
22. See note 20 supra at 460, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
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at the time the contract was executed.2" The majority opinion did not concern
itself with this problem.
A question of mutuality was raised by defendant. It claimed that plaintiff had
an arbitrary unilateral power to change the price terms of the Bethlehem-Turner
contract by raising its quotations for steel. The Court rejected this claim stating,
".. . this escalation clause provided for increases or decreases in accordance with
changes in Bethlehem's regular prices to all purchasers. 24 (Emphasis added).
However, the clause (see above) seems to permit a price change anytime
*. said material prices, labor rates and/or freight rates shall be increased...
It cannot be concluded, on the basis of the wording of the clause, that the
parties intended "prices to all purchasers" to be the extrinsic standard by which
escalation would be determined.25  Nevertheless, since the referee found that
Bethlehem in fact charged uniform and regular prices to all purchasers of its
steel products, including its own fabrication and erection division, such prices
provided a method whereby escalation could be determined and thereby satisfied
the requirement of mutuality.20 Moreover, while it was probably assumed by
the parties that plaintiff would supply steel of its own making, that did not appear
to be a requirement of the contract 2
Waiver Of Nonassignment - Clause Of Confract
A motion picture made by National Pictures Inc., had been accepted by
Twentieth Century-Fox for distribution. There were certain assignments connected
with the profits of the picture that Twentieth Century refused to recognize on
the grounds of a non-assignment clause in its agreement with National. The
assignees requested a declaration of right and Twentieth Century moved for a
summary judgment. The problem presented in Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 2  was whether there was sufficient evidence of waiver of the non-
assignment clause to present a triable issue.
The Court recognized that funds can be made unassignable by written agree-
ment between the parties29 but also that this prohibition can be waived.a0 The
23. Ibid. at 459.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Raleigh Assoc. v. Henry, 302 N.Y. 467, 473, 99 N.E.2d 287, 291 (1951);
Simpson Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 73 F. Supp. 858 (1947).
26. Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1940); Ken-Rad.
Corp. v. R. C. Bohanpan, Inc., 80 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1935); Cf. WILLISTON, LAW
CONTRACTS §41 (rev. ed. 1938).
27. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 283 App. Div. 69, 126
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1st Dep't 1953).
28. 3 N-Y.2d 395, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1957).
29. Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891
(1952).
30. Devlin v. Mayor of City of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875).
